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Abstract
In this paper we deal with the mean-variance portfolio selection for a defined contri-
bution (DC) pension fund. Since this problem is time-inconsistent, a number of papers
have proposed to tackle it through either a Nash equilibrium approach or a precom-
mitment strategy. Here, we adopt the dynamically optimal approach introduced by
Pedersen and Peskir (2017), and we compare the dynamically optimal strategy with the
precommitment one. While it is well known that the precommitment strategy is the
solution to a target-based problem, we show that the same holds for the dynamically
optimal strategy. In particular, the precommitment strategy has a constant target,
while the dynamically optimal strategy has a time-varying target whose expectation
coincides with the constant target of the previous case. We also show that the expected
wealth is the same under the two approaches. Numerical applications show that (i)
the median of the risky asset’s share is lower for the precommitment than the dynam-
ically optimal strategy; (ii) the amount of money invested in the precommitment risky
portfolio is highly more volatile than in the dynamically optimal case; (iii) the vari-
ance of wealth is lower with the precommitment strategy than with the dynamically
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optimal one; (iv) under scenarios of extreme market returns (either good or bad), the
dynamically optimal strategy allows a more effective reaction because of the continuous
adjustment of the final target.
Keywords. Time inconsistency, dynamic programming, martingale approach, pre-
commitment approach, mean-variance portfolio selection.
JEL classification: C61, D81, G11.
1 Introduction and motivation
The risk management of defined contribution (DC) pension schemes is gaining increasing
importance in industrialized countries. The population aging is threatening the solvency
of Pay As You Go public pension systems, and the largely adopted solution is to enhance
the employment-based occupational pension schemes, with an overall preference towards
defined contribution schemes rather than defined benefit schemes. The search of the most
appropriate portfolio strategy in the accumulation phase is the subject of extensive research
in the actuarial and financial literature.
Two common optimization criteria are the maximization of the expected utility of the
fund’s wealth at retirement, and the mean-variance approach. In this paper, we focus on
the latter. An important reason for preferring the mean-variance criterion over the expected
utility approach is that it transforms the difficult problem of selecting the individual’s risk-
aversion coefficient of a generic utility function into the easier task of choosing an appropriate
final target (see Vigna; 2014). Thus, in the context of DC pension funds the mean-variance
approach is more user-friendly and of larger applicability.
It is well known that the mean-variance portfolio selection is a time-inconsistent prob-
lem due to the presence of the variance of final wealth in the performance criterion (Zhou
and Li; 2000 and Basak and Chabakauri; 2010). The problem of time-inconsistency is com-
monly approached in three ways: (i) the precommitment approach (Strotz; 1956), (ii) the
game-theoretical or Nash equilibrium approach (e.g. Basak and Chabakauri; 2010), and (iii)
the dynamically optimal approach introduced by Pedersen and Peskir (2017), which is a
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continuous-time version of the so-called naive approach described by Pollak (1968).1
The first two approaches have been widely investigated in the portfolio selection problem
for DC pension schemes, while the third one has not been adopted in this context. However,
the following short review of pros and cons of these two approaches suggests that none of
the existing approaches can be considered “the best one” under all viewpoints, and this
conclusion stresses the need to investigate alternative investment strategies. Many of the
below mentioned papers go in that direction.
Cui et al. (2017) emphasize that the precommitment approach pursues global objectives,
while the Nash equilibrium strategy cares about local interests, and they propose a third self-
coordination policy that aims at balancing global interest and local interests of the decision-
maker. Cong and Oosterlee (2016) show that the precommitment strategy is consistent
with an investment target but not with a risk attitude, and vice versa the time-consistent
strategy is consistent to a risk attitude but not to an investment target, and they add that “it
is hard to say whether being consistent with a target or being consistent with a risk aversion
attitude is best.” Two papers that attack with a different angle the time inconsistency of the
precommitment strategy are Cui et al. (2012) and Shi et al. (2017), who propose a weaker
notion of time consistency (neither related to the game theoretical nor to the dynamically
optimal approach) and find that, while the precommitment strategy in the continuous time
in the presence of a pure diffusive market satisfies it, the same is not true for the multi-period
time or in a jump diffusion market; they propose semi-self-financing revised mean-variance
strategies that beat the precommitment one.
It is worth noting that some limits of the time-consistent policy of the game theoretical
approach have been highlighted too. According to Wang and Forsyth (2011), the time-
consistent policy can be found by applying time consistency constraints on the precommit-
ment strategy, and yields therefore an inferior efficient frontier. Another important drawback
of the game theoretical approach is in Bensoussan et al. (2019): they analyze the effect of
constraints on the value function of both precommitment and game theoretical approaches,
and find the unexpected result that for game theoretical approach the presence of constraints
can improve the payoff, while for the precommitment approach this paradox does not occur.
1In the remaining of the paper, the third approach (and the corresponding investment strategy) will be
either called dynamically optimal, or dynamically optimal naive, or simply naive.
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Since the risk management problem in a DC pension scheme is a crucial topic in the
agenda of welfare systems of many countries, the relevance of investigating strategies alter-
native to precommitment and Nash equilibrium is evident. In particular, in the existing
literature the third approach mentioned above, the naive strategy, has never been adopted
in DC pension funds. This paper fills this gap in the literature by adopting the dynamically
optimal naive approach to solve a mean-variance portfolio selection problem in a DC pension
scheme. By so doing, this paper also provides actuaries with useful insight regarding the
application of the naive and the precommitment investment strategies to DC pension funds.
A preview of our results is the following. We find that, similarly to the precommitment
approach, also the naive one is equivalent to a target-based approach. Differently from the
precommitment approach, the target of the naive strategy is stochastic and moves over time
in response to renovated circumstances. In the simple Black and Scholes financial settings
with constant parameters we prove that the expectation of the stochastic target associated
with the naive strategy coincides with the constant target of the precommitment strategy.
In the same settings we also prove that the expected wealth of precommitment and naive
strategies coincide. Numerical simulations show that: (i) the median of the risky asset’s share
is lower for the precommitment than the dynamically optimal strategy; (ii) the amount of
money invested in the precommitment risky portfolio is highly more volatile than in the naive
case; (iii) the variance of wealth is lower with the precommitment strategy than with the
naive one; and (iv) because of the continuous adjustment of the final target, under scenarios
of extreme market returns both in the good and in the bad direction, the naive strategy
allows a more effective reaction: in a bear market phase it provides a better hedge against
losses, while in a bull market phase it allows to exploit the high returns.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define the financial
market. In Section 3 we set the mean-variance problem. In Section 4 we present and compare
the precommitment and the dynamically optimal approaches. In Section 5 we derive the
optimal portfolios for the two approaches, while in Section 6 we provide further theoretical
results about their comparison. Section 7 is devoted to numerical simulations and Section 8
concludes.
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2 The model
At time t0 ≥ 0 a worker joins a DC pension scheme whose initial fund is x0 ≥ 0. We assume
that from t0 till T > t0 the worker pays periodic contributions into the fund as a percentage
of his salary, and the retirement T is fixed. Therefore, neither the contribution rate nor the
retirement date are control variables.2 The plan member decides the asset allocation at any
time t ∈ [t0, T ].
We present a general model, in which the uncertainty on an arbitrage free and complete
financial market is driven by a set of s stochastic state variables. In the market one riskless
asset and n risky assets are listed. As a particular case, we also present a framework where
all the state variables are constant and there is only one risky asset following a geometric
Brownian motion (so-called Black and Scholes model, Bjo¨rk; 1998).
2.1 General model
The financial market is arbitrage free, complete, frictionless, and continuously open at any
time t ∈ [t0, T ]. The risk is described by a set of n independent Brownian motions W (t),
defined on the complete filtered probability space {Ω,F (t) ,P}, where {F (t)}t∈[t0,T ] is the
filtration generated by the Brownian motions and P is the real-world probability measure.
The financial market is described by the following variables:
• s state variables z (t) (with z (t0) = z0 ∈ Rs known) whose values solve the matrix
stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dz (t)
s×1
= µz (t, z)
s×1
dt+ Ω (t, z)
s×n
dW (t)
n×1
, (1)
• one riskless asset whose price G (t) solves the (ordinary) differential equation
dG (t) = G (t) r (t, z) dt,
where r (t, z) is the spot instantaneously riskless interest rate;
2In reality, to some extent the retirement time and in some cases also the contribution rate can be chosen
by the worker. However, in this work we focus on the asset allocation only.
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• n risky assets whose prices S (t) (with S (t0) = s0 ∈ Rn known) solve the matrix
stochastic differential equation
dS (t)
n×1
= IS
n×n
[
µ (t, z)
n×1
dt+ Σ (t, z)
n×n
dW (t)
n×1
]
, (2)
where IS is the n× n square diagonal matrix gathering the prices S1, S2, ..., Sn.
The drift and diffusion terms in (1) and (2) are assumed to satisfy the usual conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of a strong solution to the SDEs.
The absence of arbitrage and completeness imply the existence of a unique risk-neutral
equivalent martingale measure Q. This also implies the existence and uniqueness of a market
prices of risk ξ (t, z) ∈ Rn which solves the linear system Σ (t, z) ξ (t, z) = µ (t, z)− r (t, z) 1,
where 1 is a vector of 1’s (i.e. ∃Σ (t, z)−1). Assuming that ξ (t, z) satisfies the Novikov’s
condition, the Girsanov theorem applies and the Wiener processes dW (t) can be rewritten
under Q as follows:
dWQ (t) = ξ (t, z) dt+ dW (t) . (3)
The Radon-Nikodym derivative is (the prime denotes transposition):
m (t0, t) = e
− 1
2
 t
t0
ξ(u,z)′ξ(u,z)du− tt0 ξ(u,z)
′dW (u) ⇐⇒
dm (t0, t) = −m (t0, t) ξ (t, z)
′ dW (t) ,
m (t0, t0) = 1.
Thus, given any t−measurable random variable Ξ (t), the following relationship holds
true
EQt0 [Ξ (t)] = Et0 [Ξ (t) ·m (t0, t)] , (4)
where EQt0 [•] and Et0 [•] are the expected values conditioned on F (t0) and computed under
the risk neutral or the real world probabilities, respectively.
Remark 1. Throughout the paper, the notation Et0 [•] denotes E [•|Ft0 ] and is a compact
version of the more complete notation Et0,z0,x0 [•] .
Let B (t, T ) be the price at t of a zero-coupon bond expiring in T , and σB (t, T ) the
(vector) diffusion term of dB(t,T )
B(t,T )
. It is well known that the so-called “forward probability
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measure” (FT ) can be defined as follows
dWQ (t) = σB (t, T ) dt+ dW
FT (t) , (5)
and, given any T−measurable random variable Ξ (T ), we can write
EQt
[
Ξ (T ) e−
 T
t r(u,z)du
]
= EFTt [Ξ (T )]E
Q
t
[
e−
 T
t r(u,z)du
]
= EFTt [Ξ (T )]B (t, T ) , (6)
where the new nume´raire of the economy is B (t, T ) (Bjo¨rk; 1998). FT is useful for simplifying
the role of contributions in the evolution of the pension fund’s wealth.
Remark 2. The forward probability measure is needed to split the expected value of a product
into the product of two expected values, as in (6). In this way, also the derivative of the
expected value can be written in a much simpler way.
A stochastic contribution c (t, z) > 0 is continuously paid by the member into the fund’s
wealth X (t). If w (t) ∈ Rn contains the monetary amount invested at time t in each risky
asset (i.e. a portfolio) and satisfies the usual “admissible” properties (Karatzas and Shreve;
1998), the wealth dynamics are given by the following SDE:
dX (t) =
(
X (t) r (t, z) + c (t, z) + w (t)′ (µ (t, z)− r (t, z) 1)) dt+ w (t)′Σ (t, z) dW (t) . (7)
2.2 Black and Scholes model, constant salary
Our general model collapses into the Black and Scholes framework if we assume µz = 0
and Ω = 0 (where 0 is a matrix/vector of zeros), i.e. all the state variables are constant.
Accordingly, both the interest rate and the contributions are constant and positive: r ≥ 0,
c ≥ 0. Furthermore, in the financial market, we have n = 1 and both µ and Σ = σ are
constant. Thus, we can write
dG (t) = G (t) rdt,
dS (t) = µS (t) dt+ σS (t) dW (t) ,
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and the wealth dynamics is accordingly
dX (t) = (X (t) r + c+ w (t) (µ− r)) dt+ w (t)σdW (t) . (8)
3 The mean-variance problem
At time t0 with initial state variables z0 and initial wealth x0 the plan member wants to
maximize the expected final wealth at retirement, adjusted by the wealth variance that can
be interpreted like a risk measure. Specifically, he wants to solve the following mean-variance
problem:3
[PMVt0,z0,x0] sup
w
JMV (t0, z0, x0, w) = sup
w
{Et0 [X (T )]− αVt0 [X (T )]} , (9)
where the optimization is done over some set of admissible controls, and α > 0 is a measure
of the agent’s risk aversion.
It is well known (e.g. Zhou and Li; 2000) that it is not possible to solve the mean-
variance problem
[PMVt0,z0,x0] with dynamic programming, because of the presence of a non-
linear function of expected final wealth in the performance criterion (Bjo¨rk et al.; 2017).
Thus, according to the existing literature, the problem is said to be time-inconsistent.
There are three possible ways to tackle this time-inconsistency: (i) a precommitment
approach; (ii) a game theoretical approach; (iii) a dynamically optimal or naive approach.
The first gives raise to a time-inconsistent policy, while the last two approaches lead to
time-consistent policies.
In the current literature on defined contribution pension schemes, only the first and
the second approaches have been thoroughly investigated, see, among others, He and Liang
(2013), Yao et al. (2013), Yao et al. (2014), Menoncin and Vigna (2017), Guan and Liang
(2015) and Wu et al. (2015). Instead, the third one has neither been adopted nor analyzed.
In this paper we fill this gap of the literature. In particular, we investigate the adoption
of the dynamically optimal naive approach in a defined contribution pension scheme and we
3We use Vt0 [•] as a short notation for Vt0,z0,x0 [•], similarly to what we do for the expectation, see Remark
1.
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make a comparison with the precommitment approach.
4 The precommitment and the dynamically optimal
naive approaches
4.1 Precommitment approach
Given the initial point (t0, z0, x0), the so-called precommitment strategy that solves the mean-
variance problem
[PMVt0,z0,x0] in (9) is the control plan wˆ that maximizes just JMV (t0, z0, x0, w).
More formally, we can write what follows.
Definition 1. Given the mean-variance problem (9), if there exists a strategy wˆt0,z0,z0 (t, z, x),
with (t, z, x) ∈ [t0, T ]× Rs × R, that maximizes JMV (t0, z0, x0, w), i.e., a control map
wˆt0,z0,x0 : [t0, T ]× Rs × R→ Rn, (10)
such that
JMV (t0, z0, x0, wˆt0,z0,x0) = sup
w
JMV (t0, z0, x0, w) ,
then the strategy wˆt0,z0,x0 (t, z, x) for (t, z, x) ∈ [t0, T ] × Rs × R is called precommitment
strategy.
The precommitment strategy for
[PMVt0,z0,x0] in both models of Sections 2.1 and 2.2 exists
and is known in closed form (Vigna; 2014, and Menoncin and Vigna; 2017).
4.2 Dynamically optimal or naive approach
The dynamically optimal approach introduced by Pedersen and Peskir (2017) is the continuous-
time version of the naive approach described by Pollak (1968). This approach can be easily
defined from the precommitment approach. We illustrate the construction of the dynamically
optimal strategy for the mean-variance problem
[PMVt0,z0,x0] in three steps.
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Step 1. Assume that for the initial point (t0, z0, x0) there exists the precommitment
strategy
wˆt0,z0,x0 : [t0, T ]× Rs × R→ Rn (11)
that maximizes the criterion JMV (t0, z0, x0, w).
Step 2. Define the new control map
w˜ : [t0, T ]× Rs × R→ Rn (12)
as follows
w˜ (t, z, x) := wˆt,z,x (t, z, x) ∀ (t, z, x) ∈ [t0, T ]× Rs × R, (13)
where the right hand side of (13) is obtained by replacing (t0, z0, x0) with (t, z, x) in the
function (11).
Step 3. The strategy w˜ (t, z, x) for (t, z, x) ∈ [t0, T ]× Rs × R given by (13) is called the
dynamically optimal or naive strategy.
To put it in simple terms, the dynamically optimal strategy is obtained by replacing
(t0, z0, x0) with (t, z, x) in the precommitment strategy. Therefore, the calculation of the
dynamically optimal naive strategy for the models of Sections 2.1 and 2.2 is straightforward.
4.3 Link between the two approaches
There is a strict link between the dynamically optimal naive and the precommitment ap-
proaches:4
• At time t0 with wealth x0 the dynamically optimal naive investor and the precommitted
investor play the same strategy wˆt0,z0,x0 (t0, z0, x0), and they face the same problem[PMVt0,z0,x0].
4To improve the readability and the interpretation, in what follows we will sometimes refer only to wealth
(that is the only controlled state variable), and will ignore the remaining state variables. In the special case
of the Black and Scholes market, where there are no state variables other than wealth, this turns out to be
correct.
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• When time passes by, at time t ∈ ]t0, T ] with wealth x the naive investor faces problem[PMVt,z,x] and solves it with the precommitment approach at time t, as if his initial point
were (t, z, x).
• In fact, the naive investor plays wˆt,z,x (t, z, x), that would be the initial control played
by an investor who, starting at time t with wealth x, wants to solve Problem
[
PMVt,z,x
]
over the time horizon [t, T ] with the precommitment approach.
• Then, the intuition is that the dynamically optimal investor can be seen as the contin-
uous reincarnation of the precommitted investor.
• Such an investor is called eitherdynamically optimal by Pedersen and Peskir (2017) or
naive by Pollak (1968).
4.4 A target-based approach
Both strategies that we have presented in the previous sections, can be interpreted as two
particular cases of target-based problems. Indeed, it is possible to prove (Zhou and Li; 2000,
and Vigna; 2014) that a target γt0,z0,x0 ∈ R exists such that at any time t ∈ [t0, T ] with
wealth x the precommitted investor plays the strategy that minimizes the following criterion
Et
[
(X (T )− γt0,z0,x0)2
]
.
In other words, the precommitted investor plays the strategy that makes the final wealth
as close as possible to the target γt0,z0,x0 . In this case the target is constant over time.
Instead, it can be proved that the naive investor at time t with wealth x plays the strategy
that minimizes the following criterion
Et
[
(X (T )− γt,z,x)2
]
.
In other words, the dynamically optimal naive investor plays the strategy that makes the
final wealth as close as possible to the target γt,z,x. Nevertheless, in this case the target is
time-varying and it also depends on the wealth x achieved at time t (i.e. γt,z,x 6= γt0,z0,x0).
In the next section we show the value of the target for the two approaches.
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5 The precommitment and the naive portfolios
Since the naive portfolio is obtained from the precommitment one, we first present the
precommitment strategy.
5.1 The precommitment portfolio
After Zhou and Li (2000), it is known that the mean-variance problem (9) can be recast as
a target problem in the following form
inf
w
J (t0, z0, x0, w) = inf
w
Et0
[
1
2
(X (T )− γt0,z0,x0)2
]
, (14)
in which
γt0,z0,x0 =
x0 +
 T
t0
EFst0 [c (s, z)]B (t0, s) ds
B (t0, T )
+
1
2α
Et0
[
e2Φ(t0,T )
]
B (t0, T )
2 , (15)
Φ (t0, T ) = −
 T
t0
r (u, z) du− 1
2
 T
t0
ξ (u, z)′ ξ (u, z) du−
 T
t0
ξ (u, z)′ dW (u) . (16)
The form of the target is worth a comment. The first term of (15) coincides with the
forward price of a floating versus fix swap. Let us assume that the fund wants to exchange
its future stochastic cash flows till time T with a fixed amount xT0 of money to be paid in
T . This forward price xT0 is a kind of certain equivalent for the whole cash flows of the fund,
and, with a light abuse of terminology, we will call it certain equivalent in T , or T–certain
equivalent. The value of xT0 must satisfy the following pricing equation:
0 = EQt0
[
xT0 e
−  Tt0 r(u,z)du −
(
x0 +
 T
t0
c (s, z) e
−  st0 r(u,z)duds
)]
. (17)
Through this contract, the fund pays its initial wealth x0 and all the subsequent payments
c (t, z) to its counterpart, and, in exchange, it receives, at maturity T , a constant amount of
money xT0 that solves (17). If we simplify this equation, the final result is
xT0 =
x0 +
 T
t0
EFst0 [c (s, z)]B (t0, s) ds
B (t0, T )
. (18)
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The target γt0,z0,x0 is greater than the T–certain equivalent, in fact:
γt0,z0,x0 = x
T
0 +
1
2α
Et0
[
e2Φ(t0,T )
]
B (t0, T )
2 ,
and the amount that is added to xT0 for obtaining the target is a function of the risk aversion
α. If the risk aversion is very high, then the fund will try to stay as close as possible to the
T–certain equivalent, while if α is sufficiently low, the target will depart substantially from
the T–certain equivalent.
In the Black and Scholes case, with c and r constant, the T–certain equivalent becomes
xT0 =
x0 + c
 T
t0
e−r(s−t0)ds
e−r(T−t0)
= x0e
r(T−t0) + c
er(T−t0) − 1
r
,
which coincides with the compounded value at the riskless rate r of initial wealth and con-
tributions (i.e., the amount of money that could be obtained at time T by investing initial
wealth x0 and future contributions in the riskless asset). In the same framework, the target
is
γt0,x0 = x0e
r(T−t0) + c
er(T−t0) − 1
r
+
1
2α
eξ
2(T−t0), (19)
where ξ = µ−r
σ
is the Sharpe ratio of the risky asset.
The solution to problem (14) is provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal strategy of Problem (14), that coincides with the precommit-
ment solution to Problem (9), is
wˆt0,z0,x0 (t, z, x) = B (t, T )
(
γt0,z0,x0 − xTt
)
(Σ′)−1 ξ (20)
+ (Σ′)−1 Ω′
∂
(
B (t, T )
(
γt0,z0,x0 − xTt
))
∂z (t)
−B (t, T ) (γt0,z0,x0 − xTt ) (Σ′)−1 Ω′∂ lnEt [e2Φ(t,T )]∂z (t)
13
where xTt is the T–certain equivalent at time t:
xTt =
x+
 T
t
EFst [c (s, z)]B (t, s) ds
B (t, T )
(21)
and γt0,z0,x0 and Φ (t0, T ) are given in (15) and (16), respectively.
Proof. This result has been proven previously by Menoncin and Vigna (2017). For the
reader’s convenience, we provide the proof here in the Appendix (A).
The optimal portfolio is formed by three components.
1. A speculative component proportional to the ratio between the market price of risk ξ
and the diffusion matrix Σ. This component also contains the distance between the
initial target γt0,z0,x0 and the T–certain equivalent (21) at time t.
2. A hedging component that hedges the fund against the stochastic changes in the T–
certain equivalent xTt . Actually, x
T
t is a stochastic variable since it is a conditional
expected value. This portfolio component is needed because the state variables are
stochastic (i.e. Ω 6= 0) and is proportional to the correlation between the asset prices
and the state variables. In fact, the matrix (Σ′)−1 Ω′ can be written as
(Σ′)−1 Ω′ = (Σ′)−1 Σ−1ΣΩ′ = (ΣΣ′)−1 ΣΩ′,
where (ΣΣ′)−1 is the inverse of the variance covariance matrix, while ΣΩ′ is the matrix
that contains the covariances between the asset prices and the state variables. Thus,
the term (Σ′)−1 Ω′ can be interpreted as a kind of beta ratio between the market and
the state variables.
3. The last hedging component is again proportional to the distance between the initial
target γt0,z0,x0 and the T–certain equivalent x
T
t . Nevertheless, this time, the portfolio
component hedges against the stochastic changes in the discount factor Et
[
e2Φ(t,T )
]
. In
particular, the portfolio contains the semi-elasticity of this discount factor with respect
to the state variables.
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Black and Scholes model
The precommitment strategy for the Black and Scholes model of Section 2.2 is5
wˆt0,x0 (t, x) =
ξ
σ
[
γt0,x0 e
−r(T−t) − x− c1− e
−r(T−t)
r
]
, (22)
in which γt0,x0 is given by (19).
Note that in the Black and Scholes case, the hedging portfolio components do not play
any role, since all the state variables (r and c) are constant (i.e. Ω = 0).
5.2 Dynamically optimal naive approach
The dynamically optimal naive strategy for the general model of Section 2.1 is obtained by
substituting γt0,z0,x0 with γt,z,x. In particular, given the value of γt0,z0,x0 in (15), we can write
γt,z,x =
1
2α
Et
[
e2Φ(t,T )
]
B (t, T )2
+
x+
 T
t
EFst [c (s, z)]B (t, s) ds
B (t, T )
,
or
γt,z,x = x
T
t +
1
2α
Et
[
e2Φ(t,T )
]
B (t, T )2
,
and, accordingly, the dynamically optimal naive strategy is
w˜ (t, z, x) =
1
2α
Et
[
e2Φ(t,T )
]
B (t, T )
(Σ′)−1 ξ (23)
+ (Σ′)−1 Ω′
(
γt,x
∂B (t, T )
∂z (t)
− ∂
 T
t
EFst [c (s, z)]B (t, s) ds
∂z (t)
)
− 1
2α
Et
[
e2Φ(t,T )
]
B (t, T )
(Σ′)−1 Ω′
∂ lnEt
[
e2Φ(t,T )
]
∂z (t)
.
We note what follows.
1. The speculative portfolio component does not depend any longer on the contributions.
5In the Black and Scholes model s = 0 and there is no z variable.
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In fact, the state variable c (t, z) does not appear in the portfolio component containing
(Σ′)−1 ξ.
2. The second portfolio component that hedges against the stochastic changes in the
T–certain equivalent xTt , instead, still depends on contributions.
3. The last hedging portfolio component does not contain contributions.
Black and Scholes model
The dynamically optimal naive strategy for the Black and Scholes model of Section 2.2 is
obtained by substituting (t, x) to (t0, x0) in (22), and is:
w˜ (t, x) =
ξ
σ
1
2α
e(ξ
2−r)(T−t), ∀ (t, x) ∈ [t0, T ]× R, (24)
in which we see that the amount invested in the risky asset at time t does depend on t but
does not depend on the fund level x at time t.
Under the hypothesis that the variables ξ and σ are positive, we can see that the amount
of money optimally invested in the risky asset w˜ (t, x), is either increasing or decreasing over
time depending on the sign of the difference ξ2− r. The sign of this difference is not obvious
(recall that ξ = µ−r
σ
). When the interest rate is “sufficiently” high (low) the difference
ξ2 − r is negative (positive), and the amount of money invested in the risky asset increases
(decreases) over time.
6 Black and Scholes case: two theoretical results
In this section we present two theoretical results holding in the Black and Scholes case
that shed further light on the interactions between the precommitment and the dynamically
optimal approaches.
The first result is that, although the precommitment and the naive strategies are sub-
stantially different, the expected value of the corresponding wealth is the same at any time.
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Proposition 2. In the Black and Scholes financial market, let Xˆ(t) and X˜ (t) denote the
wealth at time t under adoption of the precommitment and dynamically optimal naive strat-
egy, respectively. Then,
Et0
[
Xˆ (t)
]
= Et0
[
X˜ (t)
]
∀t ∈ [t0, T ] . (25)
Proof. See Appendix (B).
The second result refers to the connection between the constant target of the precom-
mitment approach and the moving target of the dynamically optimal naive approach. In the
precommitment approach the fund’s wealth at time T is optimally set as close as possible
to a constant target decided at time t0 and given the initial wealth x0. Instead, in the naive
strategy the fund’s wealth at time T is optimally set as close as possible to a time-varying
target that depends on both the current time t and the current wealth x. Interestingly,
we find that the expectation at time t0 of the stochastic time-varying target relative to the
dynamically optimal strategy coincides with the constant target.
Proposition 3. In the Black and Scholes financial market, if X˜(t) denotes the wealth at
time t under adoption of the dynamically optimal naive strategy with X˜ (t0) = x0, then
Et0
[
γt,X˜(t)
]
= γt0,x0 ∀t ∈ [t0, T ] . (26)
In other words, the target process γt,X˜(t) is a martingale.
Proof. See Appendix (C).
Then, the similarities between the two strategies are twofold. Standing at time t0, over
time the two strategies produce the same expected wealth. Moreover, standing at time t0,
the final target pursued at every time t remains on average the same.
It is then important to simulate and compare the actual behavior over time of the two
strategies and the corresponding wealths, in order to identify those differences that cannot
be captured on average.
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7 Simulations
In the Black and Scholes model we have run 1000 Monte Carlo simulations with weekly
discretisation for both the precommitment and the naive strategy and made a comparison
between the two strategies with respect to the behavior over time of several quantities, such
as the optimal portfolio and the optimal wealth. We have also investigated the distribution
of the time-varying targets relative to the naive approach and compared them with the
constant target of the precommitment approach.
The parameters for the simulations are
• t0 = 0, and T = 20: we assume that the financial horizon is 20 years;
• x0 = 1: the initial wealth can of course be scaled for taking into account any other
wealth level;
• c = 0.1: we assume that the contribution is a percentage of the initial wealth (in this
example 10%);
• r = 3%, µ = 8%, and ξ = 1
3
, which imply a volatility σ = 0.15.
With these data, the T–certain equivalent xT0 is
xT0 = x0e
r(T−t0) + c
er(T−t0) − 1
r
= 4.562515,
while
1
2α
eξ
2(T−t0) =
4.613907
α
.
Thus, the initial target is
γt0,x0 = x
T
0 +
1
2α
eξ
2(T−t0) = 4.562515 +
4.613907
α
.
If we want the target to be 1.2 times the T–certain equivalent xT0 , we have
4.562515 +
4.613907
α
= 1.2× 4.562515,
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from which α = 5.0563, and so
γt0,x0 = γ0,1 = 5.475.
In what follows, we report the results of the simulations for the wealth, the optimal
portfolio, and the time-varying target.
Figure 1 reports the statistics for the precommitment (PC) and the naive (N) wealth.
The graph on top reports the mean and mean plus/minus twice the standard deviation for
both approaches. The bottom left graph reports the minimum, the maximum, and the 5th,
25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles of PC-wealth, while the graph on the right reports the
same measures for the N-wealth.
Figure 2 reports the behavior of the precommitment and naive wealth in the four extreme
cases: the best and the worst cases for the final PC-wealth and the best and the worst cases
for the final N-wealth. It also reports the path of the price of the risky asset in those extreme
cases, as well as the time-varying target of the naive approach.
Figure 3 reports the statistics for the precommitment and the naive optimal investments
in the risky asset (i.e. the optimal strategies). The graph on top reports the median for
both strategies. The bottom left graph reports the minimum, the maximum, and the 5th,
25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles of PC-strategy, while the graph on the right reports the
same measures for the N-strategy.
Finally, Figure 4 reports the statistics of the time-varying targets for the naive approach,
γt,x, as well as the constant target for the precommitment approach, γt0,x0 .
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Figure 1: Precommitment (PC) and naive (N) wealths. Top graph: mean and mean ±
2 standard deviation. Bottom-left graph: statistics of PC-wealth. Bottom-right graph:
statistics of N-wealth.
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Figure 2: Extreme scenarios and corresponding wealth evolution. Top-left graph: price of
risky asset in the four extreme scenarios. Top-right graph: time-varying target for naive
approach in the four extreme scenarios. Bottom-left graph: PC- and N- wealths in the best
scenario for N-wealth and the worst scenario for PC-wealth. Bottom-right graph: PC- and
N- wealths in the best scenario for PC-wealth and the worst scenario for N-wealth.
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Figure 4: Statistics of time-varying targets for the naive approach, γt,x, and constant target
for precommitment approach, γt0,x0
From Figures 1–4 we observe what follows.
• On average the wealth growth over time is exactly the same under the two approaches,
that is consistent with Proposition 2 (Figure 1).
• The standard deviation of wealth is lower with precommitment than with the naive
approach (Figure 1).
• In the worst cases, the precommitment wealth behaves much worse than the naive
wealth (Figure 1). On the other hand, in the most favorable cases (at least top 25%),
the naive wealth behaves better than the precommitment wealth (Figure 1).
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• The two paths of the risky asset that lead to the worst PC-wealth and the worst N-
wealth look quite similar one another, and the same applies for the two paths of the
risky asset that lead to the best PC-wealth and the best N-wealth (Figure 2, top-left
graph).
• The time-varying target for the naive approach adjusts to market returns and increases
over time in the two best cases (best PC-wealth and best N-wealth), while it decreases
over time in the two worst cases (worst PC-wealth and worst N-wealth) (Figure 2,
top-right graph).
• In both the worst case for the precommitment wealth and the worst case for the naive
wealth, the precommitment wealth behaves worse than the naive wealth, and the gap
is larger in the worst case for the PC-wealth, as expected (Figure 2, bottom graphs).
In both the best case for the precommitment wealth and the best case for the naive
wealth, the naive wealth behaves better than the precommitment wealth, and the gap
is larger in the best case for the naive wealth, as expected (Figure 2, bottom graphs).
• On average, the optimal portfolio of the precommitment strategy contains less risky
asset than the naive strategy (Figure 3).
• The optimal share invested in the risky asset according to the precommitment strategy
is highly more volatile than in the naive case (Figure 3).
• The optimal share invested in the risky asset on average is decreasing over time (Figure
3).6
• As expected from Proposition 3, the time-varying targets are on average equal to the
constant precommitment target. Furthermore, the time-varying targets are symmetri-
cally distributed around the mean (Figure 4).
The fact that the variance of wealth is lower with the precommitment strategy is consistent
with the theory: the precommitment strategy minimizes the variance of the final wealth
6This decreasing trend occurs also in the case r < ξ2, when instead the amount is increasing (see Equation
(24)).
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given the same expected final wealth; therefore, any other strategy/portfolio that produces
the same expected final wealth should produce a larger variance of final wealth.
Quite interestingly, however, we observe that in the worst cases for both the naive and
the precommitment wealth, the precommitment strategy produces a lower wealth than the
naive strategy. This outcome is both interesting and somehow unexpected, given that the
precommitment strategy provides the lowest variance of final wealth. This only seeming
contradiction is due to the fact that the naive strategy adjusts the final target at each time
according to renovated circumstances. Instead, the precommitment strategy keeps the final
target fixed over time. Indeed, when the market performance is bad, the fund is low; if the
target remains fixed and too high compared to current wealth, the investment in the risky
asset becomes important and this pushes the fund further down if the unfavorable market
returns persist. If, instead, the target is regularly adjusted to current wealth and decreases
when the fund falls down, the investment in stocks does not need to be so remarkable, and
the potential loss from persisting bad market performance is reduced. Thus, the dynam-
ically optimal strategy, which accounts for a time-varying target, seems to allow a more
effective reaction against unfavorable market conditions that last for a long period, while the
precommitment strategy does not.7
In addition, in the scenarios that lead to the best cases for both the naive and the
precommitment wealth, the naive strategy produces a larger wealth than the precommitment
strategy. This outcome is quite interesting too, and is again explained by the feature of the
naive strategy to adjust the target. Indeed, when returns are high for a long period, the
naive strategy implies a target which is higher and higher. Accordingly, this strategy leads
to a larger final wealth than the precommitment strategy which, instead, is characterized by
a constant target. Finally, we can conclude that the feature of the naive strategy to adjust
the targets according to changing market conditions gives an extra reward to the pensioner
in the presence of extreme scenarios of market returns, both in the good and in the bad
7On the other hand, whether the naive strategy always yields a more effective reaction in a period of
bad market returns can be debatable. This is true when the bad returns keep on also in the future, because
the precommitment strategy keeps on investing in the risky asset when returns are poor because of the
unchanged high target (in that sense the precommitment approach is said to be contrarian, see Forsyth
and Vetzal; 2017). But if a (short) period of bad returns is then followed by a period of good returns, the
precommitment strategy might turn out to be better off than the naive one.
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direction.
The heavier investment in stocks of the precommitment strategy in bad scenarios is
confirmed by the higher volatility of the precommitment investment strategy with respect
to the naive strategy, that instead turns out to be more stable.
It must be noted that a similar result was observed by Forsyth and Vetzal (2017), in
a comparison between precommitment strategy and constant proportions strategy: they,
too, found that smallest values for the precommitment strategy were notably lower than the
smallest values for the constant proportion strategy. They also found that the difference
between the two strategies in the bad market scenarios was wider in the presence of leverage
(unconstrained strategy) than with a no-leverage constraint. Therefore, it is likely that the
remarkable difference we observe in the worst market scenarios between the precommitment
and the naive strategy would be reduced should some no-short-selling constraints be imposed
in the model.
Finally, we have run other simulations with a more and a less ambitious target (i.e. a
target equal to κxT0 with κ > 1.2 and κ < 1.2). When the target is changed, the quality
of the result does not change, while the magnitude is modified according to the obvious
financial intuition: higher (lower) target is pursued by investing higher (lower) percentage
of wealth in the risky asset.
8 Concluding remarks
In this work we have solved the mean-variance portfolio allocation problem for a defined
contribution pension scheme in an arbitrage free and complete market driven by any num-
ber of stochastic state variables and having any number of risky assets. We have provided
and investigated the solution to the asset allocation problem with two common methods, the
precommitment and the dynamically optimal naive approaches. While the precommitment
approach has been deeply studied and applied in the literature, to the best of our knowl-
edge this is the first paper that (i) provides the dynamically optimal naive strategy in a
general model with many state variables and many assets; and (ii) thoroughly investigates
the dynamically optimal naive approach in the framework of a DC pension fund.
The precommitment method is equivalent to fixing a given target at the initial time
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and keeping it unchanged over time. The dynamically optimal method is based on this
precommitment strategy, where we modify the target at each instant in time, as if we were
solving a newly starting optimization problem.
From the theoretical point of view, we prove that in the Black and Scholes market the
expected wealth under the two strategies is the same. Moreover, we prove that the expected
value of the time-varying target of the dynamically optimal strategy coincides with the
constant target of the precommitment strategy.
Merits and weaknesses of the two strategies are further investigated via numerical sim-
ulations, which show that: (i) the precommitment portfolio contains less risky asset than
the naive strategy; (ii) the amount of money invested in the precommitment risky portfolio
is highly more volatile than in the naive case; (iii) as expected, the variance of wealth is
lower with the precommitment strategy than with the naive one; (iv) interestingly, under
scenarios of extreme market returns (either good or bad) that drive an extreme (rich or
poor) performance in terms of the final wealth, the naive strategy allows a more effective
reaction because of the continuous adjustment of the final target: in particular, in a bear
market phase the naive strategy provides a better hedge against losses, while in a bull market
phase it allows to exploit the high returns. These results might be of help to actuaries and
investment managers of DC pension funds.
This paper leaves room for further research. In particular, the numerical analysis of a
market with stochastic interest rate and stochastic contributions would be worth investiga-
tion. More importantly, introducing a variable risk aversion αt, and studying its impact on
the precommitment and the naive strategies would also be quite interesting. This would also
allow comparison with Bensoussan et al. (2019) and Bjo¨rk et al. (2014), who find the Nash
equilibrium strategy in the presence of a variable risk aversion.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Problem (14) can be recast as a static problem where the choice variable is the final wealth:
infX(T ) Et0
[
1
2
(X (T )− γ)2]
s.t. EQt0
[
−  T
t0
c (s, z) e
−  st0 r(u,z)duds+X (T ) e−
 T
t0
r(u,z)du
]
≤ x0.
(27)
The Lagrangian function of this problem is
L = Et0
[
1
2
(X (T )− γt0,x0)2 + λX (T ) e−
 T
t0
r(u,z)du
m (t0, T )
]
− λ
(
x0 +
 T
t0
EFst0 [c (s, z)]B (t0, s) ds
)
,
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. The derivative of L with respect to X (T ) must be set
to zero for each state of the world, i.e.
X∗ (T ) = γt0,x0 − λe−
 T
t0
r(u,z)du
m (t0, T ) . (28)
Now, λ is computed from the constraint in (27) where X∗ (T ) is substituted, and the
inequality is replaced by the equality (since we want the solution to be compatible with the
minimum amount of initial wealth):
λ =
γt0,x0B (t0, T )−
 T
t0
EFst0 [c (s, z)]B (t0, s) ds− x0
Et0
[
e
−2  Tt0 r(u)dum2 (t0, T )
] .
By defining the stochastic process Φ (t, T ) as in (16), we can write
λ =
γt0,x0B (t0, T )−
 T
t0
EFst0 [c (s, z)]B (t0, s) ds− x0
Et0 [e−2Φ(t0,T )]
,
28
or
λ =
B (t0, T )
Et0 [e−2Φ(t0,T )]
(
γt0,x0 −
x0 +
 T
t0
EFst0 [c (s, z)]B (t0, s) ds
B (t0, T )
)
.
In the optimal solution, the constraint (27) must hold at any instant in time:
X∗ (t) = −
 T
t
EFst [c (s, z)]B (t, s) ds+ Et
[
X∗ (T ) e−
 T
t r(u,z)dum (t, T )
]
.
If the optimal final wealth (28) is plugged into this equation we have:
X∗ (t) = −
 T
t
EFst [c (s, z)]B (t, s) ds+ γt0,x0B (t, T )− λm (t0, t) e−
 t
t0
r(u,z)duEt
[
e2Φ(t,T )
]
.
(29)
Now, the passages are as follows:
1. dX∗ (t) is found through Ito¯’s lemma on (29) (differentiating w.r.t. m (t0, t) and z (t));
2. λm (t0, t) e
−  tt0 r(u,z)duEt
[
e2Φ(t,T )
]
is substituted into the diffusion term of dX∗ (t) from
(29);
3. this diffusion term is set equal to the diffusion term of investor’s equation in (7) in
order to find the portfolio which replicates the optimal wealth. Such a portfolio is
given by (20).
B Proof of Proposition 2
If we plug the precommitment strategy (22) in the wealth (8)we get the following dynamics
for the precommitment wealth Xˆ (t)
dXˆ (t) =
{
Xˆ (t) r + c+ ξ2
[
x0e
r(t−t0) +
c
r
(
er(t−t0) − 1)− Xˆ (t) + 1
2α
eξ
2(T−t0)−r(T−t)
]}
dt+(...) dW (t) .
(30)
By taking the expectation at time t0 given the wealth x0, we get the following linear
ordinary differential equation (ODE) for Et0
[
Xˆ (t)
]
:
29
dEt0
[
Xˆ (t)
]
dt
=
(
r − ξ2)Et0 [Xˆ (t)]+ b (t) , (31)
where we have swapped the expected value and the derivative operators, and in which
b (t) = c+ ξ2x0e
r(t−t0) + ξ2
c
r
(
er(t−t0) − 1)+ ξ2
2α
eξ
2(T−t0)−r(T−t),
with initial condition
Xˆ (t0) = x0. (32)
The solution of the linear ODE (31) with the initial condition (32) is the expectation of
the precommitment wealth:
Et0
[
Xˆ (t)
]
= x0e
r(t−t0) +
c
r
(
er(t−t0) − 1)+ 1
2α
e−r(T−t)
(
eξ
2(T−t0) − eξ2(T−t)
)
. (33)
By following the same procedure for the dynamically optimal wealth (plugging (24) into
(8), and taking expectation), we get the following ODE for the expected dynamically optimal
wealth
dEt0
[
X˜ (t)
]
dt
= rEt0
[
X˜ (t)
]
+ c+ ξ2
1
2α
e(ξ
2−r)(T−t), (34)
with the same initial condition (32). By solving (34) with initial condition (32), we get the
following expectation of the dynamically optimal naive wealth:
Et0
[
X˜ (t)
]
= x0e
r(t−t0) +
c
r
(
er(t−t0) − 1)+ 1
2α
e−r(T−t)
(
eξ
2(T−t0) − eξ2(T−t)
)
, (35)
and comparing (33) with (35), we get the claim (25).
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C Proof of Proposition 3
The analogue of γt0,x0 (19) at time t with wealth x is
γt,x =
1
2α
eξ
2(T−t) + xer(T−t) +
c
r
(
er(T−t) − 1) .
Therefore
Et0
[
γt,X˜(t)
]
=
1
2α
eξ
2(T−t) +
c
r
(
er(T−t) − 1)+ Et0 [X˜ (t)] er(T−t). (36)
By plugging (35) into (36), and recalling (19), we get
Et0
[
γt,X˜(t)
]
= x0e
r(T−t0) +
c
r
(
er(T−t0) − 1)+ 1
2α
eξ
2(T−t0) = γt0,x0 , (37)
that is claim (26).
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